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The interest of, homo sapiens in money is almost as prurient and
pervasive as his interest in sex. Indeed, although accurate data are
not available, it seems likely that he spends more of his time pursuing
the former than the latter. At any rate, books about money seem
nearly as numerous and popular as books about sex. Ralph Ginzburg
demonstrated his characteristic flair for profitable publishing when
he switched from Eros (under some legal pressure, to be sure') to
Moneysworth. But while good writers on sex are so few as to be vir-
tually nonexistent, at least in modern times, there are several writers
on finance whose works have genuine literary merit. Of these John
Brooks is among the best. He may well be the best historian of high
and low finance since those observant young men, Charles Francis
Adams and his brother Henry, chronicled the rascalities of Jim Fisk,
Jay Gould, Daniel Drew, and Cornelius Vanderbilt more than a cen-
tury ago. 2 It is unlikely that The Go-Go Years will sell as well as
Jacqueline Susann's current novel, whatever it is called, but it will
deserve better reviews.
Mr. Brooks' new book on the rise and fall of the stock market in
the five years or so which ended in 1970 is well-written, but I note
with some regret that it is less so than his earlier works. Mr. Brooks
is a regular contributor to The New Yorker, in which most of The
Go-Go Years first appeared. That periodical has in recent years be-
come not much more than a sort of upper-middlebrow version of
The New York Review of Books, relieved at increasingly infrequent
intervals by flashes of its old wit. The quality of its editorial prose
has sunk to such a level that its advertising pages, directed at the
t Richard Ely Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
2. C.F. & H. ADAmS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE (Great Seal Books ed. 1956).
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leftish carriage trade who account for most of its circulation, are far
more effective arguments for social reform than the earnest and tedious
homilies in "The Talk of the Town."
I fear that Mr. Brooks' clear mind and clear style show signs of
succumbing to that debilitating influence. Thus, he commonly de-
scribes the left-wing street and campus demonstrators of the 1960's,
most of them brawny, well-nourished youths in their late teens or
early twenties and many of them quite ready to break glass or heads,
as "boys and girls," and "kids," and even "children." 3 It is positively
embarrassing to see a writer of Mr. Brooks' quality compose such a
clich&ridden sentence as this: "Which is worse in a time of national
crisis: a young swinger who speculates with his investors' money but
pursues high-minded investment policies, or a more conservative codger
who keeps his clients in the comfortable blue chip stocks of corpora-
tions that fuel the wars and foul the rivers and the air?" There are
even inept metaphors: Pyramids do not fall because they become top-
heavy.r Mr. Brooks' craftsmanship and care are not what they were.
No doubt I am captious because I expect so much more of Mr.
Brooks than of common journalists. It is but just to say that most of
his tale is well-told, entertaining and instructive, in part because its
intrinsic interest is great. His subject is one of history's great orgies
of speculation. This variety of mass mania is, of course, about as old
as the development of societies in which sizeable numbers of citizens
have more money than they can spend on the necessities bf life. Rich
Romans outbid each other, often to the tune of millions of sestertii,
for citrus tables and murrhine glass." Otherwise sober and hardheaded
Dutchmen embarked on a spree of wild speculation in, of all things,
flowers in the Tulipomania of 1634. Citruswood, glass, tulip bulbs,
even the paintings of Jackson Pollock, have at least some intrinsic
value, however slight. Not until the invention and development in
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries of shares of stock
and stock exchanges were men able to speculate in things which
frequently had no intrinsic value at all, things whose sole worth lay
in the chance that the buyer could find a fool still greater to whom
he could sell for a higher price than he himself had paid. That there
was a surfeit of such fools 200 years ago is evidenced by the South
3. See J. BRoors, THE Go-Go YEARs 10, 214-15 (1973) (hereinafter cited to page
number only].
4. P. 270. The young swinger in question had, as Mr. Brooks shows, resorted to
practices which were at best sharp and at worst dishonest. See p. 1105 infra.
5. P. 158.
6. See, e.g., PLINY, NATURAL HIsToRY 72, 76 (L. Haberly ed. 1957).
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Sea Bubble and John Law's Mississippi Company.7 The model of
such enterprises is the Anglo-Bengalee Disinterested Loan and Life
Assurance Society, directed by the adroit Tigg Montague. Though
Dickens invented that company 130 years ago,8 it has a strong generic
resemblance to Equity Funding Corporation and would fit very nat-
urally into one of Mr. Brooks' chapters. Mr. Montague could have
done wonders with a computer.
The most obvious recent parallel to the stock speculation of the
Go-Go Years is the Great Bull Market of the 1920's,9 which produced
operators quite as picturesque and prehensile as Mr. Brooks' cast of
characters. 10 The Go-Go Years, however, undoubtedly cost a far
greater number of investors far more money than the bursting of
the bubble 40 years before, for the simple reason that the herd of
sheep had multiplied past counting, and the new and improved strain
had thicker fleeces. In 1970 there were some 31 million stockholders,
whose losses Mr. Brooks plausibly estimates at about $300 billion."
The public investors were left sadder, if not wiser, but hardly any
of them jumped out of windows. No such cataclysm as the Great De-
pression of the 'thirties has ensued. All in all, the story is more
picaresque comedy than tragedy.
The fact is, of course, that the stock market has always served two
purposes. One is the eminently proper one of giving people a place
to invest their savings, hopefully in ways that will earn income for
the investors, create jobs, and produce more, of the goods and services
that people want. This is the aspect which the propaganda of the
New York Stock Exchange naturally stresses. The other is that of a
gigantic Casino, with branches in every city and hamlet in the land,
offering action just as fast and more respectable than that available
at Las Vegas or Aqueduct.
The dominance of the Casino avatar in the 'sixties was shown by
the emphasis which the speculators put on earnings per share, the
"bottom line." What the traditional thrifty investor cares about is divi-
7. See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3-5 (2d ed. 1961).
8. See C. DICKENS, THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT 427-48 (Oxford
U. Press ed. 1951).
9. The best, or at any rate the most readable, work on the subject is J. GALBRAITH,
THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (1955).
10. Perhaps the greatest of them was Howard Hopson, who is said to have printed
proxies on the back of dividend checks, so that the stockholder gave Hopson a proxy
by the simple act of endorsing the check. He certainly invented the collapsible deben-
ture, convertible into common stock at the option of the issuing corporation. See
In re Associated Gas & Electric Co., 61 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 149 F.2d
996 (2d Cir. 1945).
11. P. 253. Mr. Brooks, whose guess is as good as any, thinks that only one-third
of the 31 million suffered serious losses.
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dends, the actual payout to stockholders. What gives a share of stock
such intrinsic value as it has is the prospect that its owner will re-
ceive, sooner or later, his share of the corporation's actual, and hope-
fully large, income. But in the Go-Go Years the people who bought
Leasco or Electronic Data Systems or National Student Marketing or
Equity Funding, or even IBM or Polaroid, cared very little what
dividend the stock paid, or whether it paid any dividend at all. Divi-
dends are taxable as income, at rates up to 70 percent; it takes a long
time to get rich from dividends. What the stock buyers of the 'sixties
wanted, and got for a time, was a rapid increase in the stock's market
price, which would enable them to sell it within a short time at much
more than they had paid, 12 with the profit taxed as capital gains at
a maximum rate of 25 percent.13
The market price, however, was a function of projected earnings.
If a company's reported earnings per share had tripled every year for
several years, the investors and their advisers projected that trend into
the future, and even the hereafter, and bought the stock at perhaps
100 or more times its current earnings. This phenomenon, the magic
of the price/earnings ratio, produced the fantastic rises in the market
prices of some of the conglomerates, 14 the aggressive acquirers of other
companies. The principle of success for conglomerates was, like the
wheel and the bow, of magnificent simplicity. Let me give a somewhat
oversimplified paradigm. Conglomerate A reports earnings of $2 a
share, up from 300 four years ago, on its 1 million outstanding shares.
It sells at 50 times earnings, $100. B, a stodgy manufacturing company,
also reports earnings of $2 on its 400,000 shares, which is just about
the same as its earnings for the past several years. It sells at ten times
earnings or $20. A issues 100,000 shares, worth $10 million at the
market, in exchange for all of B's stock, and the B stockholders have
an instant paper profit of $5 a share. A has outstanding 1.1 million
shares but now shows consolidated earnings of $2.8 million-an in-
stant increase of more than 25 percent in earnings per share. If the
price/earnings ratio rises or remains constant, the market price of
the stock will rise.
As A repeats the process, its reported earnings per share increase
by leaps and bounds; the market price soars upward like a rocket. If
investors extrapolate the increasing earnings over future years of suc-
12. See, e.g., pp. 18-19, 156-57. 262.
13. At the present time capital gains for an individual stockholder are taxed at
a maximum of 25 percent on the first $50,000 and a maximum of 35 percent on the
excess. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1201.
14. See generally pp. 150-81.
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cess, the P/E ratio may itself rise, and for market price the blue sky
is the limit. So long, and just so long, as the P/E ratio of A remains
high and unglamorous target companies with lower P/E ratios can
be found, the conglomerate will enjoy marvelous success. The new
discovery produced such astonishing Jonah-swallows-the-whale exhibi-
tions as Leasco's successful ingestion of Reliance Insurance Company
(more than four times its size), and its nearly successful effort to en-
gorge the $9 billion Chemical Bank New York Trust Company (more
than 22 times its size).'1
Not -all the rapid rises in earnings, of course, were produced by
such a technique. Some, such as those of IBM, Xerox, and Polaroid,
were perfectly genuine. In others the galloping earnings were produced
by "creative accounting," which some people might call fraud and
which Mr. Brooks justly and thoroughly excoriates.16 National Student
Marketing, for example, managed to generate practically all of its
reported earnings for 1969 by including the profits of subsidiaries
which in fact had not been acquired until after the end of the year.17
We may hope that some day Mr. Brooks will write the story of Penn
Central, whose apparent income for several years preceding its col-
lapse was the result of accounting creativity at least as imaginative
and far larger in scale. Penn Central, to select but one example, manu-
factured nearly $10 million of income in 1968 by purchasing its own
bonds on the open market at a deep discount, using cash it could ill
spare, and reporting the difference between par and the purchase
price as "profit."' 8
The almost perpendicular rise in the price of some stocks naturally
produced go-go or. "performance" investment companies which sold
their own shares to the public, invested the proceeds in the stock of
go-go companies, and thus showed enormous and rapid increases in
their own asset value per share. Some of the youthful "gunslingers"
who managed the investment portfolios were gifted and lucky gamblers,
like Gerald Tsai, whose career is brilliantly described by Mr. Brooks. 19
15. Pp. 227-59. Mr. Brooks, who seems to admire the dash and enterprise of Leasco's
founder, Saul Steinberg, fails to mention the litigation arising out of Leasco's takeover
of Reliance Insurance Company, in which the court determined that Steinberg and
his associates had violated the Securities Act of 1933. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
16. See, e.g., pp. 158-63.
17. Pp. 283-84.
18. See SEC STAFF REPORT TO THE SPECIAL SUBCOIMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
HousE Comm. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMmERCE 52 (1972). The Report cites many




Vol, 83: 1100, 1974
The Bursting of the Bubble
Some, like Bernie Cornfeld,20 who avoided the officious prying of the
SEC by selling the shares of his fund (whose assets consisted of the
shares of American mutual funds) only to foreign investors, and Fred
Mates resorted to their own varieties of creative accounting. Mr.
Mates, for example, bought 300,000 shares of something called Omega
Equities for $3.25; at the time Omega was, for no particular reason,
trading over-the-counter at $24. The catch was that the stock Mates
bought, not being registered under the Securities Act, could not be
sold to the public-and certainly there was no other market for it.
Mates compromised with his conscience by valuing it on the books of
The Mates Investment Fund at only $16, but still showed an instant
increase in asset value of nearly $4 million. When the SEC blew the
whistle on Omega by suspending trading in its stock, and Mates' own
shareholders attempted to redeem their shares, he simply suspended
redemptions-an unheard-of event in the mutual fund industry. Ul-
timately, Omega shares proved to be worth about a nickel. 21
There are many, many other fascinating items in The Go-Go Years.
Among the abundance of picturesque personalities are such men as H.
Ross Perot, who lost $450 million (on paper) on a single day in 1970,
and still had about a billion left.2 2 Mr. Brooks' book offers a large
and engaging rogues' gallery, and also some honest and able men,
like Bernard Lasker and Felix Rohaytn, who managed (with the aid
of Perot) to pull the New York Stock Exchange through the worst
of the crisis of 1970.23 Mr. Brooks is to be commended as well for
his lucid explanations of the workings of such esoterica as hedge
funds, 24 and his objective dissection and criticism of such serious evils
as insider trading, the high-pressure sale of "hot issues," and "churn-
ing," which results from the constant temptation of brokers to in-
crease their own commissions by persuading customers to sell sound
stocks and buy others which may or may not be sound..2 5 Most of
the analysis of the stock market's workings is good reading, cautionary
and occasionally encouraging.
Unfortunately, as I suggested earlier, Mr. Brooks sometimes yields
to the temptation to engage in cosmic and rather mushy philosophizing
on such topics as youth and urban problems. Such stuff is probably
mandatory under The New Yorker's House Rules, but it stands in
20. Pp. 270-71.
21. Pp. 266-70.
22. Pp. 1-2, 14-23.
23. See generally pp. 291-347.
24. Pp. 141-44.
25. See pp. 220-21, 278-83.
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painful contrast to the prose he produces when he sticks to his last.
Some of it is unintentionally funny, which is unusual for Mr. Brooks
-as when he describes with a straight face and every appearance of
edification the efforts of the with-it pastorate of Trinity Church to
modernize religion, and improve the spiritual state and generally "en-
rich the lives" of Wall Streeters: The means chosen were rock bands,
balloons, peace demonstrations, folk singers, and inadequately clad
dancers capering in the sanctuary.2 6 Mr. Brooks has a keen eye for
the unctuous hypocrisy of the old generation of Wall Streeters, who
sometimes combined regular prayer and church attendance with sharp
and occasionally fraudulent practice. But he does not recognize the
hypocrisy in the chic piety of some new Wall Streeters. Thus, the
above-mentioned Mr. Mates referred to his youthful staff as "flower
children" and refused to buy the stock of corporations producing arma-
ments, cigarettes, or pollutants (few of which, as it happens, were in
the go-go class). Mr. Brooks, impressed by so much sanctity, says that
Mr. Mates acted "bravely and honorably" 27 when (after suspending
redemption of the shares of his mutual fund) he reduced the value
at which the Mates Fund carried Omega Equities from $16 to the
$3.25 he had paid for it, thereby effecting a corresponding reduction
in the redemption price of the Fund's shares (which, however, remained
unredeemable). I fail to see either bravery or honor; it seems to me,
from Mr. Brooks' account, that Mr. Mates was caught and had no
alternative if he wanted to stay in business. When Mr. Mates actually
resumed redemptions, he reduced Omega's value on his books to 50
cents.
Similarly, Mr. Brooks accepts at face value the hoary merchants-of-
death myth that Wall Street thrives on wars and rumors of war and
goes into a decline whenever a threat of peace develops28-or at least
that it did so until the Vietnam War, when it was reformed by Abbie
Hoffman and Trinity Church. The historical facts are otherwise.
World War I, when capitalists were even more ruthless and predatory
than they are now, supplies the most dramatic example: On August
1, 1914, the New York Stock Exchange was hit by such a tidal wave
of sell orders that it suspended trading for more than four months.2 9
On December 21, 1916, when Secretary of State Lansing said that the
26. Pp. 222-26.
27. Pp. 269-70.
28. See, e.g., pp. 10, 213-14.
29. See M. SULLIVAN, 5 OUR TIMEs 48-49 (1933). Bond trading was resumed on No-
vember 28, 1914, and cash trading in stocks on December 12. Unrestricted trading was
not permitted until April 1, 1915.
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United States was being drawn into the war, a wave of frantic selling
produced a volume of more than three million shares30-an enormous
figure for those days. On December 8, 1941, stock prices declined more
than seven percent, equivalent to a drop of about 59 points in the
present Dow-Jones average. Stocks dropped approximately six percent
at the outbreak of the Korean War. They dropped a little when the
Cuban missile crisis developed and rose a little when it ended. The
market generally rose during World War II, but probably less be-
cause traders anticipated huge corporate profits3' than because of in-
flation and the related fact that incomes were high and consumer
goods scarce. A similar pattern developed during the Korean War,
whose effect Mr. Brooks calls "modestly bullish." 32 The truth seems
to be that Wall Street dislikes war scares, precisely as it dislikes any
variety of uncertainty.
Generally, however, Mr. Brooks gives a very accurate picture of the
boom and bust of the late 'sixties and of the influences which pro-
duced it. Some of those influences, such as the human urge to get
rich quick, are probably ineradicable. Are there cures for other causes
of the orgy and the ensuing katzenjammer? The South Sea Bubble
produced the Bubble Act of 1720. 33 The 1929 crash produced the
Securities Act of 1933,3 4 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3- the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,36 the Trust Indenture
Act of 1939,3 7 and the Investment Company Act of 1940.38 The pri-
mary emphasis of the 1933 and 1934 Acts was on full disclosure-i.e.,
to insure that investors were given the information they needed to
make rational decisions. Mr. Brooks concludes that, "Full disclosure
in the nineteen sixties market was largely a failure, giving the small
investor the semblance of protection without the substance"; he ques-
tions whether it can ever accomplish much.39 Certainly there is room
for tougher enforcement, both by the SEC and private suitors, as
demonstrated by the boom in litigation under § 10(b) of the 1934
30. Id. at 626.
31. Mr. Brooks says that "World War II failed to produce a major bull market
in large part due to the excess profits tax .... P. 214.
32. Id.
33. 6 Geo. I, c. 18. More than 20 years before, Parliament had passed an act, which
proved ineffective, "to restrain the number and ill practice of brokers and stock
jobbers." 8 & 9 Win. III, c. 32 (1697).
34. Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, tit. 1, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970)).
35. Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970)).
36. Act of August 26, 1935, ch. 687, tit. 1, 49 Stat. 803 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 79
(1970)).
37. Act of August 3, 1939, ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (1970)).
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Act (liability under which is generally grounded on misleading or in-
adequate disclosure)40 since the Second Circuit's landmark decision
in S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,41 which held that directors and
officers violated § 10(b) when they traded in their own company's
stock on the basis of inside information which was not disclosed to
the public. The Securities and Exchange Commission could undoubt-
edly use a larger staff to police the adequacy of disclosure in regis-
tration statements, proxy solicitations, and the various reports required
under the statutes and the Commission's regulations. Yet not even
the fullest disclosure can prevent some fish from biting on unbaited
hooks. The SEC may, and often does, require registrants to state that
the prospect of dividends is remote, that the sale of the issue will
instantly increase the book value of the promoters' shares and dilute
the value of the public's shares to a point far below the sale price,
or even that the issuer is actually insolvent. The stock still finds buyers.
Congress and the Commission cannot prevent fools from parting
with their money, but they can devise more protections from dishonest
or incompetent brokers. The Securities Investor Protection Act 42 and
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation 43 now protect the cus-
tomers of bankrupt brokers. In the aftermath of the Go-Go Years,
reforms of the internal management of the investment industry, in-
cluding stricter disciplinary procedures and higher standards for entry
into the business, are under consideration in Congress. 44 Some evils
might be alleviated by outlawing the conflicts of interest which pro-
duce them. The functions of broker and investment adviser might be
separated, thus reducing the temptation to churn customers' port-
folios in order to generate commissions.
The record of even the most honest and disinterested portfolio
managers, however, is something less than brilliant. It may well be
that there is no such thing as an expert adviser on the market: Many
knowledgeable lawyers and economists believe that there are only
two ways to make money by trading in securities-luck and inside
information. 45 There is much evidence that an investor can do quite
as well by shutting his eyes and sticking a pin in the list of stocks
traded on the Exchange as by consulting the most learned and ex-
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
41. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (1970). See S.E.C. v. Wick, 360 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (1970).
44. See Painter. An Analysis of Recent Proposals for Reform of Federal Securities
Legislation, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1576 (1973).
45. See generally B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (1973).
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perienced securities analysts, every one with an M.B.A. from Harvard
or the Wharton School. As many mutual funds did worse than the
averages as did better.46 Harvard itself took a bath in National Student
Marketing.47 The list of supposedly sophisticated investors taken into
camp by the fraudulent promoter of Atlantic Acceptance Corporation,
Ltd., included Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, First National City
Bank, Kuhn, Loeb and Company, and Princeton University.48 When
Penn Central sank, a dozen huge insurance companies (including the
Equitable, the Metropolitan, and the Prudential) went down with
more than $400 million of its bonds.
There may, in short, be little that even the wisest and most benign
laws can do to keep the public and the professionals from making
imprudent investments. Kipling summed up what is perhaps the best
hope:
I make my proper prostrations
to the gods of the Market Place;
Peering through reverent fingers,
I watch them flourish and fall,
And the gods of the Copybook
Maxims, I notice, outlast them all.49
One of the most reliable copybook maxims is biblical: "He that




49. R. Kipling, The Gods of the Copybook Headings (excerpts from Stanza 1, 1919), in
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